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I. Introduction 
The rise and decline of private sector unionization were among the more important fea­
tures of the U.S. labor market during the twentieth century. Following a dramatic spurt 
in unionization after passage of the depression-era National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) of 1935, union density peaked in the mid- 1950s, and then began a continuous 
decline. At the end of the century, the percentage of private wage and salary workers 
who were union members was less than I 0 percent, not greatly different from union 
density prior to the NLRA. 
An emerging consensus among industrial relations scholars is that absent a major 
shift in worker attitudes regarding capitalism, individualism, and the state, accompanied 
in turn by changes in the legal structure, there can be no rebound in traditional union­
ization. 1 The status quo is not an altogether attractive scenario, however, even for those 
not enamored with the contribution that unions, in their current form, make to social 
welfare. More of the same means that in the shrinking unionized sector we retain a sys­
tem that is overly confrontational and does too little to facilitate value-enhancing behav­
ior among management and unions. More of the same means that employees in most 
workplaces will have few outlets for collective voice and participation and that compa­
nies will be constrained in their ability to promote and facilitate the exercise of voice. 
And more of the same means continuing a growing reliance on governmental regulation 
and the courts to set economy-wide workplace standards, reducing the role of enter­
prise-level bargaining (implicit and explicit) between employers and their work forces. 
Our purpose is to examine the relationship between private sector union density 
and the wage premium, identifying where we have been and where we may go in the 
future.2 The starting point is the fact that labor unions are in decline and now represent 
a small proportion of the private sector work force. This trend poses a dilemma for 
society, workers, and public policy. Although the effects of unions in the workplace 
vary enormously, our reading of the evidence is that on balance unions are detrimental 
to company performance and economic efficiency. But in addition to unions' negative 
effects, union representation and collective bargaining provide workers with varying 
degrees of workplace democracy, collective voice, monitoring of working conditions, 
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protection from discrimination, and enforcement of contractual provisions. For the 90 
percent of private sector workers who are not unionized, effective worker voice and 
participation are provided at less than efficient levels. And there is a substantial reliance 
on governmental regulations and workplace mandates, accompanied by a litigious 
enforcement process. 
There are various reasons why unions are in decline. Herein, we focus on the link 
between what is surely one of unions' principal functions, raising wages and other forms 
of compensation, and the consequent decline in their membership and coverage. We 
conclude that unions (and society) are caught in a cruel paradox. As long as the U.S. 
remains a competitive, open economy with a decentralized, partially organized collec­
tive bargaining system, the attempt by unions to acquire and maintain high wages 
ensures that the union sector will remain small. Our conclusion is similar to that of Free­
man and Medoff ( 1984, pp. 248-5 1), who argue that the "monopoly" face of unionism 
is putting the organized labor movement and "collective voice" out of business. From 
society's point of view, the monopoly face should be blunted and the voice face empha­
sized. In a final section of the paper, we conclude that tweaking the current system of 
labor law is unlikely to accomplish to a satisfactory degree the "less monopoly/more 
voice" outcome. Rather, we discuss the desirability of a more fundamental shift involv­
ing "conditional deregulation" or a change in the default workplace governance struc­
ture. The goal of such fundamental reform is to substantially enhance collective voice 
in the largely nonunion private sector, while at the same time constraining those forms 
of worker rent seeking deleterious to economy-wide economic performance. 
II. The Decline in Private Sector Union Density: A Summary 
Following peak membership density during the 1950s (Freeman, 1997; Troy and Shef­
lin, 1985), the percent of private nonagricultural wage and salary workers who are 
union members stood at 24.6 percent in 1973, 16.8 percent in 1983, and at 9.5 percent 
in 1999. Private nonagricultural union membership was 14.9, 1 1.9, and 9.4 million dur­
ing 1973, 1983, and 1999 (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2000, Table 1c).3 In Figure 1, we 
show union membership and density in the private sector for the years 1973- 1999. 
Readily evident is the steep decline in density during the 1980s, a decline continuing 
through today, albeit at a slower pace. 
As discussed subsequently, some of the union decline is structural, owing to 
employment shifts out of heavily unionized industries into less unionized ones. Yet one 
sees a sizable decline within industries as well. Figure 2 shows unionization within the 
manufacturing sector, as well as the share of total private wage and salary employment 
accounted for by manufacturing. Manufacturing as a percent of private nonagricultural 
employment declined from 33.2 percent in 1973 to 19.7 percent in 1999. Union den­
sity declined from 38.9 percent in 1973, to 27.8 percent in 1983, and to 15.6 percent in 
1999 (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2000, Tables lc- ld) .  Not only has manufacturing 
employment become less important over time, but union density within the manufac­
turing sector also declined sharply over the last quarter century. 
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Figure 1 
Union Membership and Density, Private Nonagricultural Workers 
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Source: Data are from Hirsch and Macpherson (2000. Table I c) for the years 1973 to 1999. Union membership 
is the number of private sector. nonagricultural. wage and salary workers who are union members (in millions). 
Density is the percentage of private sector, nonagricultural, wage and salary workers who are union members. 
An important determinant of changes in union density is the ability of unions to 
organize new members. Figures 3a and 3b (from Farber and Western, 2000) provide 
information compiled on the number of NLRB certification elections and the total votes 
cast in these elections. The number of union representation elections fell suddenly and 
sharply in the early 1980s, coinciding with President Reagan's firing of unionized 
(PATCO) air controllers who had gone out on strike.4 The number of NLRB union cer­
tification elections fell from a level of about 8,000 a year in 1980 to about 4,400 in 
1990. The level of election activity declined a bit through the later 1980s and early 
1990s, but has increased modestly following the AFL-CIO's emphasis on organizing 
since John Sweeney became president. Votes cast in these elections fell by more than 
half over the same period, from about 500,000 a year to just over 200,000 a year. The 
larger percentage decline in number of votes than elections reflects the declining aver­
age size of the election or workplace unit over time. 
The news on union organizing is even worse than is evident in the election data. 
As seen in Figure 4 (Farber and Western, 2000), union win rates in certification elec­
tions declined steadily, from a win rate of about 80 percent in 1940 to about 50 percent 
by 1975 .5 Since 1975, the win rate has hovered just at or below 50 percent in most 
years. Moreover, not only has the average size of election units fallen over time, union 
win rates are lower in larger workplace units. And this size gap in win rates has 
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Figure 2 
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Source: Data are from Hirsch and Macpherson (2000, Tables lc. ld) for the years 1973 to 1999. Union membership 
is the number of private sector manufacturing, wage and salary workers who are union members (in millions). Den­
sity is the percentage of private sector manufacturing, wage and salary workers who are union members. % Manu­
facturing is the percentage of total private nonagricultural employment in manufacturing. 
increased over time (Farber, 2001). Although good data are not available, most evi­
dence indicates that even among the union elections wins, fewer have culminated in a 
first contract between the union and employer.6 
In short, the number of union elections has declined, the average size of the elec­
tion unit has fallen, the average win rate has dropped, particularly for large units, and 
first contracts have become less likely following a union win. Efforts at reversing these 
trends are underway. But even a substantial increase in the number of new workers 
organized and first contracts obtained will not stabilize private sector union density at 
its current level. Private sector union density will continue to decline until it reaches a 
lower, sustainable level. 
III. Why Has Private Sector Unionism Declined? 
There is no shortage of explanations for why private sector unionism has fallen. Among 
the reasons given for union decline are: structural change, the response to union wage 
premiums in an increasingly competitive U.S. economy, increased management oppo­
sition, less favorable interpretation and enforcement of labor laws by the NLRB, less 
positive union sentiment among organizable workers, and the substitution of public 
workplace mandates and regulation for collective bargaining. 
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Figure 4 
Union Win Rates and Pro-Union Vote Shares in NLRB Elections, 1940-1998 
" .8 u "' ... 
u.. 
-e-- Election win rate 










40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84 88 92 96 
Fiscal Year 
Source: Farber and Weston (2000, Figure 5, p.JO). 
Our focus is the relationship between the union wage premium and subsequent 
union density. The wage premium or, more broadly, the firm's compensation structure 
is a principal avenue through which unions "tax" firm profits and influence the eco­
nomic health of firms. As discussed below, several of the explanations for the decline 
in density (e.g. ,  management opposition, increasing competition) have an economic 
basis. Union strength not only helps determine wages. Union wages in tum influence 
union organizing success, company performance and growth, and, therefore, the long­
run level of union density. 
As seen below, a useful way to analyze changes in union density is an "account­
ing" stock-flow framework in which changes in density reflect flows into and out of 
the stock of union and nonunion employment (Dickens and Leonard, 1985; Freeman, 
1988; Farber and Western, 2000). Job attrition produces a flow out of union employ­
ment. Job growth in existing workplaces provides flows into union and nonunion 
employment. Job growth taking place in new workplaces is almost entirely nonunion, 
at least initially. NLRB certification elections and subsequent first contracts lead to 
flows into union employment, while decertification elections lead to (small) flows out 
of union employment. 
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The various explanations for union decline are not mutually exclusive, and each 
is plausible. Some work primarily through their influence on employer behavior (e.g. ,  
economic competitiveness, most forms of structural change), whereas others influence 
worker demand for collective bargaining (e.g., union sentiment, the substitution of pub­
lic regulation). Even taken together, however, these factors may be insufficient to 
account fully for the fall in private sector unionization. We concur with the view that a 
broader historical look at the rise and decline of unionism during the twentieth century 
is needed to understand important social and political forces that shaped both the sud­
den rise and the gradual but continuous decline of unions (Freeman, 1997; Lipset and 
Katchanovski, 2001). 
Structural Change and Union Organizing. Structural change can include changes 
in industry and occupation, the demographic structure of the labor force, and the 
regional location of jobs. By structural change we mean union employment changes due 
to shifts in labor demand or supply, independent of changes in union wages. Jobs have 
moved out of heavily unionized manufacturing and into industries such as trade and 
services with traditionally low union density. Changes in technology have led to smaller 
employment shares in blue-collar or production jobs and larger employment in non­
production occupations. Female workers are less likely to be unionized and the share 
of women in the labor force increased markedly. And substantial employment growth 
has occurred in the South and Southwest, where union density is traditionally low. 
Empirically, it is of course difficult to distinguish structural changes affecting union 
employment from the responses of firms to changes in union wages. 
The structural explanation has obvious appeal. Yet it receives surprisingly little 
support from analysts, who have argued that structural change cannot explain all or 
even most of the change in unionization. As evidence, authors have pointed to Canada 
and, to a lesser extent, other countries, which have witnessed structural shifts in indus­
try, occupation, and demographics similar to those in the U.S . Unlike the U.S. ,  Canada 
and other countries have not seen much of a decline in union density (Freeman and 
Medoff; 1984; Weiler, 1990; Riddell, 1993). These authors emphasize that the U.S.  
experience is  unique, focusing in particular on management opposition, the rise in unfair 
labor practices, and organizing difficulties faced by unions given U.S .  labor law. Troy 
(1992, 2000), however, has emphasized that the comparison to Canada is misleading 
given the importance and growth of the public and quasi-public sectors (e.g., health 
care) in Canada. If one could isolate Canada's unregulated private sector one would 
also see a decline in union density, although at a slower rate than in the U.S .  
A more direct assessment of the effect of structural change can be obtained using 
CPS data with worker characteristics. Farber and Krueger (1993) estimate linear prob­
ability models showing the probability of union membership, with and without controls 
for occupation, industry, and individual characteristics, for the years 1977, 1984, and 
1991. Structural controls can account for about 35 percent of the union decline between 
1977 and 1984, but less than 10 percent of the decline between 1984 and 1991. 
Union accounting studies also shed light on the role of structural change, although 
its precise effect cannot be directly identified. Dickens and Leonard (1985) examine the 
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period 1950-1979 and conclude that union decline stems primarily from a fall in organ­
izing and success rates and only modestly from "economic" factors. This approach 
probably understates the effect of structural change, since part of the decrease in suc­
cessful organizing is a result of structural changes in industry, occupation, region, and 
(to a lesser extent) demographics. Dickens and Leonard shift the focus to organizing, 
finding that it had steadily fallen throughout most of the period and was insufficient to 
offset the natural attrition rate of union jobs. Note that their study period ended prior 
to the sharp drop in organizing in the early 1 980s. Freeman and Medoff ( 1984) used a 
similar framework and predicted (correctly) that private sector union density would fall 
to a new steady state around 1 0  percent, given 1970s organizing rates. The lower new 
organizing rates since the early 1980s are leading to a new steady-state density below 
1 0  percent. 
Farber and Western (2000) calculate that given current organizing rates and rates 
of union and nonunion employment growth, steady-state private sector density will be 
less than 5 percent. 7 They find that much of the recent decline is fueled by the slow net 
growth in union relative to nonunion employment. This result lends credence to the 
structural explanation, although slow net employment growth no doubt reflects other 
factors, such as increased competitiveness. One way to think about this result is that the 
steady decline in organizing prior to 198 1 is a vital factor in explaining the long-run 
decline in private sector density. The sharp drop in organizing in the early 1 980s ratch­
eted downward the sustainable rate of private sector union density from some level 
around 10 percent to a level closer to 5 percent. Farber and Western conclude that even 
if organizing had maintained its level from the early 1980s, private sector union den­
sity would have fallen to a level just 2.5 percentage points higher than it is currently. 
Because organizing levels have been so low since the early 1980s, changes in pri­
vate sector density are most sensitive to differential rates in the net growth of union 
and nonunion employment. Even substantial increases in new organizing would have 
rather modest effects on union density. Farber and Western (2000) provide several coun­
terfactual scenarios. What is clear is that to have avoided the decline in union density, 
new organizing would had to have been far higher than current levels. There is no obvi­
ous way that this could have happened. Organizing is costly, and the union base is 
shrinking. Although new organizing has fallen, organizing expenditures per union 
member have not. In short, the modest increase in organizing since John Sweeney 
assumed the presidency of the AFL-CIO has slowed the decline in private sector den­
sity, but it has not and probably cannot stop the decline. Absent large unanticipated 
shifts in organizing costs and worker support for unions, private sector density should 
decline further before it reaches a sustainable level. 
Union Wage Premiums and the Competitiveness of the U.S. Economy. In order for 
unions to capture rents for their members, they must either directly increase workplace 
productivity (beyond what those same workers would produce and earn elsewhere), 
appropriate some share of owners' surplus stemming from market power of the firm, or 
tax some portion of the firm's normal returns. Although unionization no doubt leads to 
productivity increases in many workplaces, on average these effects appear to be close 
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to zero, and certainly insufficient to offset wage increases. 8 In short, wage and com­
pensation premiums are the principal avenue through which unions affect firm prof­
itability, which in turn influences management behavior toward their unions and toward 
new union organizing. This relationship is discussed more fully in a subsequent section. 
Ideally, we would like to track over time union effects on profitability and relate this to 
subsequent changes in union density. Time-consistent data on unions and profitability 
are not available in standard data sets. But as we see subsequently, we can track union 
wage premiums over time, thus permitting inferences to be drawn about union effects 
on firm profitability. 
The U.S .  economy has also become more competitive over time owing to the 
increased importance of international trade, changes in technology, and varying degrees 
of deregulation in highly-unionized transportation industries (airlines, trucking, rail­
roads) and utilities (telecommunications, electricity). The more competitive an indus­
try, the less likely it is to sustain a sizable union premium. Stated alternatively, a given 
wage premium will have more deleterious employment effects in more competitive 
environments. In deregulated industries that are naturally competitive such as truck­
ing, union density and wage premiums declined sharply (Hirsch and Macpherson, 
1 998). In industries such as airlines, where entry is difficult and the union strike threat 
is substantial, union density and wages have remained high, although decline was evi­
dent through much of the 1990s (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2000). 9 
There is surprisingly little work relating union wage gains to subsequent changes 
in union employment and membership. Linneman et al. ( 1 990) provide evidence that 
industries with higher wage premiums experience slower employment growth. LaLonde 
et al. (1996) show a strong negative relationship between union organizing elections and 
subsequent employment growth. In the literature on unions and company financial per­
formance, union coverage is associated with slower growth, decreased profitability, and 
lower investment in physical capital and R&D (for a survey, see Hirsch, 1997) .10 
Although the "union tax" clearly retards employment and sales growth in covered sec­
tors, it does not appear to be associated with higher rates of business failure (Freeman 
and Kleiner, 1 999; Dunne and Macpherson, 1 994). Strong unions may push a firm 
toward the cliff's edge, but they will accept concessions and demonstrate flexibility 
before pushing it over the edge. 11 
As long as competitive pressures remain strong in the private sector, the prospect 
for resurgence in union density remains dim. Decreased resistance from management 
would require a sharp increase in pro-union sentiment among its workers and a shift in 
unionism's workplace impact away from rent appropriation and toward creation of 
value added. Such cooperation is unlikely given a collective bargaining framework 
predicated more on confrontation than cooperation and as long as rank-and-file support 
for unions depends on their ability to capture rents. Value-added unionism requires 
innovations and greater flexibility in labor law, among other things, which in turn might 
facilitate more effective voice and enhanced cooperation between management and 
labor (Estreicher, 1 996). 
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Management Opposition and the NLRB. Both union leaders and academic 
researchers (Weiler, 1990; Freeman and Medoff, 1 984; Freeman, 1988) have identified 
management opposition to organization, unfair labor practices, and unfavorable rul­
ings from the NLRB as important sources of union decline. These issues are difficult 
to assess. There is little doubt that anti-union sentiment is widespread among U.S.  own­
ers and managers of nonunion companies and that business opposition to union organ­
izing has increased over time. Elections are more heavily contested than in the past, 
unfair labor practices are not uncommon, and fewer union wins culminate in first con­
tracts. It need not follow, however, that changes in managerial opposition account for 
very much of the decline in private sector density. Anti-union sentiment from business 
is hardly new, although it appears to have become more respectable as union density has 
declined. Opposition to organizing is in part the result of union wage premiums and the 
competitiveness of the economic environment. Even if union wage premiums were con­
stant, management opposition may increase owing to lower levels of unionization 
among firms' domestic and international competitors. No clear link can be found 
between the decline in organizing and decisions of the Dotson-led Board during the 
Reagan administration (Flanagan, 1 987; Farber and Western, 2000). Organizing diffi­
culties have not gone away despite a more favorable Board during the Clinton admin­
istration. Likewise, private sector union decline began prior to the 1 980s, a decline 
difficult to link directly to the makeup of the NLRB.12 
Although union density would no doubt be higher if business opposition were less 
intense, the fundamental point is that management will continue to oppose union organ­
izing as long as it is economically sensible to do so. It frequently is, particularly in a 
highly competitive world in which most of one's competitors are nonunion. Although 
the precise impact of unions on productivity is anything but clear, all evidence points 
to a negative effect of unions on profits (Addison and Hirsch, 1989; Kuhn, 1998). Stated 
alternatively, union effects on productivity are not sufficient to offset union wage 
increases. If unions did not tax profits or if union density were industry-wide, man­
agement opposition would be less substantial. It is difficult to imagine a major reduc­
tion in management opposition to organizing absent a change in the union impact on 
the bottom line or a major shift toward more pro-union sentiment among nonunion 
workers. A shift in worker sentiment regarding unions would directly influence 
employer behavior during organizing drives and make politically possible changes in 
labor law and its enforcement. 
Worker Attitude and Preferences. Work by Farber ( 1990) and Farber and Krueger 
(1 992) has concluded that weakened preferences for unionism explain much of the 
decline over time. Lipset and Katchanovski (200 1 )  measure preferences associated with 
social democratic or collectivist values, as compared to individualistic values. They 
conclude that more than in other countries, U.S. workers tend to be far more individu­
alistic and that this perspective helps explain the low levels of private sector density. 
The thesis that worker attitudes are an important explanation for the rise and 
decline of U.S. unionism receives considerable support when one views this over a long 
historical period. As emphasized by Freeman ( 1 997), unionization in the U.S.  occurred 
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in large spurts in the late 1930s, following passage of the NLRA in 1 935 and its accept­
ance by the Supreme Court in 1937, and after World War II. Passage of the NLRA and 
the spurts in unionization were made possible by a sea change in attitudes that occurred 
during the depression era. Capitalism was seen as inherently unstable, with workers 
being largely unprotected victims, while collectivist alternatives were seen in a rela­
tively positive light. Although individualism remained very much alive, its prominence 
was on the wane and far from fashionable.13 
As argued persuasively by Freeman ( 1 997), it was this shift in attitude that made 
politically possible passage of the NLRA, guaranteed majority support for unions across 
thousands of workplaces, and broke down strong management resistance to unions. 
Business leaders might remain opposed to unions, but they could not wear anti-union 
sentiment on their sleeves. Once unionization reached a sufficiently high threshold, the 
deleterious impact of unions on individual firm profitability, growth, and survival was 
small. In short, the costs of opposing union organizing rose while the economic bene­
fits fell. Following the initial spurts in union growth, there has been a continual long­
run decline in density as workers' and voters' faith in capitalism has grown and attitudes 
have moved once again toward an ethos of individuality. As private sector unioniza­
tion fell to lower densities, the economic and social calculus for management shifted 
toward a stronger resistance to union organizing. 
The implication of the above analysis is that private sector union density will 
remain at a low steady state absent a major shift in the public's attitude toward collec­
tivism. Only such a shift would break down management resistance or permit changes 
in the letter, interpretation, and implementation of U.S .  labor law. Neither industrial 
relations scholars nor we can identify a scenario by which the U.S .  private sector would 
move from a low-density steady state to a high-density steady state. But few observers 
in 1930 could have predicted the sharp rise in unionism that lay just ahead. 
The discussion above emphasizes the individualistic strain running through U.S.  
public opinion. Although this often translates into anti-union sentiment, such sentiment 
is far from universal among nonunion workers. To the extent that there is opposition, 
it is often animus to unionization in its current form. Surveys asking nonunion work­
ers if they would vote for a union in their workplace find considerable support, although 
not support sufficient to bring it about. Freeman and Rogers ( 1999) find substantial 
support among workers for a greater voice and participation in the workplace. But most 
want that voice to be exercised as part of a cooperative rather than confrontational rela­
tionship with management. The 90 percent of private sector workers who are not union­
ized are not well served by the current system, which often offers them a choice 
between a confrontational unionized labor relations environment or a nonunion gover­
nance structure with highly limited opportunities for worker voice and participation. 
Government Regulation and Mandates As a Substitute for Unions: Cause or 
Effect? Coinciding with the secular decline in union density has been an expanded role 
of government and the courts in providing workers, union and nonunion, with rights and 
protections in the workplace. Employer mandates and regulations cover such things as 
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discrimination, worker safety, overtime hours and pay, pension insurance, notice of 
plant closings, and family leave. All workers receive "services" or protection that would 
otherwise have been provided only to workers through the collective bargaining process. 
As a result, benefits to workers from joining unions have fallen and organizing has 
become more difficult. An irony here is that unions have been among the strongest pro­
ponents of workplace regulation. 14 
It is difficult to assess the impact of government regulations on union organizing, 
although it seems likely that causation runs in both directions.15 Not only has govern­
ment's increased role in the workplace decreased worker support for unions, the decline 
in private sector unionism has led to increased public support for workplace regula­
tions. In addition, declining union density has weakened the political influence of organ­
ized labor on legislation. Although unions have been notably unsuccessful in gaining 
legislative victories that apply specifically to labor (union) law, they have had success 
in pushing for workplace mandates that apply to both the union and nonunion work 
force (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). The important point here is that there exists a strong 
demand by the public for many forms of protection in the workplace. The choice is not 
one between a largely unionized labor market and a largely deregulated labor market. 
Absent a strong role for collective bargaining or some alternative vehicle for the exer­
cise of worker voice, we must rely instead on a regulated labor market characterized by 
relatively inflexible rule-making, monitoring, and litigation (Schneider, 1997). The 
desire among workers for greater voice and cooperation in their workplaces will remain 
largely unfulfilled. 
IV. Union Wage Premiums and Union Density: Theory 
Despite a consensus that union organizing strength in the U.S .  labor market has 
declined, there is not a consensus on how union wage premiums have changed over 
time. The issue is of some importance. The future course of unionization is tied in no 
small part to "what unions do." Worker support for unions is predicated in part on their 
ability to enhance compensation and working conditions, but the magnitude of the wage 
premium in tum affects current and future employment (membership). The higher the 
premium the greater will be employment growth in nonunion firms and the stronger will 
be management resistance to union organizing. Union leaders face the unenviable posi­
tion of responding to the demands of rank and file for higher compensation, knowing 
that it will lead to lower employment and membership in the future. If union member­
ship were determined solely by employer actions, maintaining union density at historic 
levels necessarily would have required a sharp reduction in the wage premium. Taking 
into account the role of workers, however, it does not follow that lower wage premiums 
would have been sufficient to avoid union decline. All else the same, lower premiums 
make workers less willing to join a union and pay union dues. Indeed, a lower wage pre­
mium could conceivably decrease density in the long run if the negative effects from a 
decline in worker support for new organizing were larger than the positive employment 
effects of employer movement along their labor demand schedules and the reduction in 
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resistance to union organizing. Although unlikely, one cannot reject a priori the asser­
tion that current union wage premiums minimize the losses in union membership.16 
In order to examine the impact of the wage premium on union employment and 
density, we next consider the predictions from standard union wage models. Although 
union wage-employment outcomes need not be on the labor demand curve, the standard 
union monopoly model is a useful starting place (Booth, 1995). The conclusions 
reached in the standard model are then extended to alternative settings. The analysis 
applies most directly to firms already unionized, taking into account the profit-maxi­
mizing behavior of employers and the wage-employment preferences of union work­
ers. It largely ignores the preferences of nonunion workers for new organizing. As 
discussed previously, worker support for organizing is a positive function of compen­
sation, while at the same time higher compensation increases management resistance 
to organizing and decreases profit-maximizing employment levels. 
In Figure 5, let DL represent employer demand for union labor, with We being the 
competitive wage. The indifference curve U represents the preferences of the union 
and its willingness to tradeoff wages and employment (membership). A common 
approach is to treat union preferences as driven by a median voter concerned about the 
wage and employment. Concern about employment as well as wages derives from the 
median union worker's own unemployment risk or from concerns about union solidar­
ity and the level of present and future union employment (Booth, 1995). The monop­
oly union selects a wage Wu on DL reflecting its preferred wage-membership mix, 
subject to the demand constraint (the tangency of indifference curve U with DL). For 
our purposes, the important point is that given demand for union labor, there is a neg­
ative relationship between the union wage premium and membership. Absent labor 
demand shifts, we should observe higher union wage premiums associated with declin­
ing union density.17 
Employer demand for labor in unionized markets is likely to have decreased 
because of increased competitiveness, labor saving technological change, weaker 
enforcement of labor law, or the like. Such a shift, as shown in Figure 5 by the move­
ment from DL to DL', is likely to lead to a wage-employment outcome associated with 
a lower union wage and employment (W u' and Eu').18 To the extent that declining den­
sity has resulted from shifting demand schedules for union labor, with little effect on 
We, we should observe union wage gaps decreasing during a period of declining union 
density. Alternatively, unions would see larger declines in membership were they to 
maintain union wage premiums at previous levels.  The important point is that if 
employer demand for union labor is shifting, union density and wage premiums rise or 
fall together. This positive density-wage relationship contrasts with the effects of a 
movement along a demand curve, where density and the wage premium are inversely 
related.19 
Wage-employment outcomes need not be characterized by the union monopoly 
model. The "right-to-manage" model (Booth, 1995) maintains the assumption of a set­
tlement on the demand curve, but the position on the demand curve lies between � and 
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Wu and is determined by the relative bargaining strength of management and the union. 
But the inverse relationship between the union wage and membership continues to hold 
for any given level of demand, while demand shifts lead to a positive relationship 
between the wage gap and membership. 
Settlements on the labor demand curve are not generally efficient for the parties. 
That is, there exist settlements off the demand curve with higher employment and lower 
wages that are preferred by both the union and management. Strong efficiency in bar­
gaining leads to a vertical contract curve C starting at We with Ec employment and a 
wage above We off the demand curve. In Figure 5, we draw that portion of the contract 
curve in which both parties are better off, i .e. ,  outcomes providing a higher union util­
ity than U and a higher firm profit (the portion of C below the isoprofit curve, not shown 
in Figure 5, that passes through Wu- E). In the strong efficiency case, there is no inverse 
relationship between the wage and employment in the short run. In the long run, how­
ever, union appropriation of quasi-rents leading to lower investment results in a lower 
level of future output and employment (Abowd, 1 989a). So the inverse relationship 
between wages and employment results even where contracts are strongly efficient. 
Decreases in labor demand lead to efficient bargaining outcomes on C', implying lower 
employment and most likely a lower union wage than on C. 20 It does not follow that 
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bargaining can achieve settlements off the demand curve, however, let alone on a ver­
tical contract curve. Evidence is far from clear-cut (Booth, 1 995; Kuhn, 1 998). Whether 
union wage-employment outcomes are on or off the labor demand curve, declining 
demand for union labor should result in a declining wage premium. 
To this point, we have considered how movements along and shifts in labor 
demand curves affect union wages and membership. Changes in union density at the 
economy-wide or industry level also affect the wage premium. Union wages vary 
directly with industry density owing to the effects of density on bargaining power and 
labor demand elasticities. Nonunion wages vary inversely with density owing to labor 
supply spillover effects and positively with density because of threat effects (Rosen, 
1969). During a period of declining density, there is less of a spillover to the nonunion 
sector and, hence, less downward pressure on nonunion wages. In this case, the union­
nonunion wage gap unambiguously declines. Declining union density also decreases the 
threat of union organizing in nonunion firms, putting downward pressure on nonunion 
wages. If the union density effect is stronger among union than among nonunion work­
ers, union premiums will decline. If the effects are equivalent among union and 
nonunion workers. the wage gap will remain unchanged. 
Empirical studies typically conclude that there exist substantial threat effects at the 
industry level, whereas spillover effects are weak, and the positive relationship between 
wages and industry density is somewhat stronger for union than nonunion workers 
(Freeman and Medoff, 198 1 ). Based on this evidence, we should expect that during a 
period of declining density, there exists downward pressure on the union wage gap.21 
Finally, the relationship between economy-wide union density and an average 
union wage premium is ambiguous where unionized labor markets are heterogeneous. 
Demand shifts are likely to have differential effects across labor markets and the aver­
age union premium may increase or decrease. For example, increases in international 
trade are likely to shift labor demand schedules (and change elasticities) differently 
across markets. Assume that one obtains large losses in union employment in sectors 
that are highly competitive and union premiums are low, and small employment loss in 
sectors with high premiums. In this case, declines in union density could be accompa­
nied by an increasing average union premium, even if premiums within all sectors 
declined or remained the same. 
V. Evidence on Union Wage Gaps, 1973-1999: Rising, Stable, or Falling? 
Although there is general agreement that union wage premiums increased during the 
late 1 970s, there is no consensus as to whether the union premium has been stable or 
falling since the early 1 980s. B lanchflower ( 1 999) estimates union wage premiums 
from the CPS for 1 983- 1 995. He concludes that the economy-wide union gap has 
remained relatively constant, with no evidence of a trend. Brats burg and Ragan ( 1 999) 
also examine this issue, concluding that there has been little change in the overall union 
premium, but dispersion in the premium across industries has declined as the U.S.  econ­
omy becomes more competitive. Hirsch and Macpherson estimate union wage premi-
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urns from the CPS for 1 973-1 999 using a time-consistent specification. Economy-wide 
they obtain a union premium estimate of . 1 72 log points in 1 983 and .140 in 1 999, sug­
gesting modest change. For the private sector, however, they obtain estimates of .2 18  
in  1 983 and . 1 51 in  1 999, a 7 percentage point decline in  the union wage premium. 
Looking at the CPS evidence (from Hirsch and Macpherson) and published data from 
the Employment Cost Index (ECI), Katz and Krueger ( 1 999, pp. 54-55) conclude that 
the union wage premium has declined. 
Herein we report time-consistent CPS evidence on union wage premium in the 
private nonagricultural sector, from 1973 through 1 999. As discussed above, theory 
does not provide an unambiguous prediction about the relationship between union 
premiums and density. Falling density can be accompanied by either a rising or falling 
wage premium. Based on evidence from the CPS and the ECI, we conclude that the 
union wage advantage in the private sector has declined over the last 1 5-20 years. Con­
clusions about the magnitude of the decline, however, are highly dependent on whether 
one focuses on adjusted (i.e., regression-based) or unadjusted wage gap estimates and 
whether one takes into account a bias that results from Census earnings imputation 
procedures. 
The principal data source for our evidence presented here is the Current Popula­
tion Survey (CPS), the monthly survey of households conducted by the U.S . Bureau of 
the Census. We summarize evidence presented in a recent paper by Hirsch and Schu­
macher (2000), who provide union wage gap estimates for private nonagricultural work­
ers from the May 1973-1981  CPS and the 1983-1999 CPS-ORG (outgoing rotation 
group) monthly earnings files. Logarithmic wage gap estimates are presented unad­
justed and adjusted for CPS worker and job characteristics. The adjusted wage gap is 
simply the coefficient on a union membership dummy variable from a log wage equa­
tion with standard controls.22 Hourly earnings are defined as usual weekly earnings 
(inclusive of overtime, tips, and commissions) divided by usual hours worked per week. 
Top coded earnings (at $999 in 1973- 1988,$1,923 during 1989-1997, and $2,885 in 
1 998-1 999) are assigned the mean above the cap based on the assumption that the 
upper tail of the earnings distribution follows a Pareto distribution. 23 Controls included 
are years of schooling, potential experience and its square (interacted with gender), 
dummy variables for gender, race and ethnicity (3), marital status (2), part-time status, 
region (8), large metropolitan area, industry (8), and occupation ( 1 2) .  
Hirsch and Schumacher's (2000) principal contribution is showing the existence 
of a systematic bias in some (but not all) types of wage gap estimates owing to the Cen­
sus hot-deck imputation procedure used for those not reporting earnings. Including 
workers whose earnings have been imputed by the Census causes a systematic down­
ward bias in union wage premium estimates. The downward bias is large- more than 
4 percentage points in recent years. Systematic bias results because union status is not 
a match criterion used by the Census in selecting an earnings donor.24 Most union work­
ers not reporting earnings have their earnings assigned based on a match to a nonunion 
donor (biasing downward union wages), while some nonunion non-reporters are 
assigned a union donor (biasing upward nonunion wages). Moreover, Census inclusion 
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and delineation of imputed earners in the CPS research and public use files have not 
been consistent over time, leading to variation in union premium estimates that have 
nothing to do with actual movements in wages. 
Hirsch and Schumacher (2000) construct a time-consistent union wage gap series 
that nets out the effect of imputed earnings. Where possible, all workers whose earnings 
have been imputed by the Census are omitted from the estimation sample. In those years 
(or months) where allocated earners are not reliably identified, wage gap estimates are 
adjusted to account for the bias. In Figure 6, we present their unadjusted and adjusted 
wage gap estimates measuring log differentials between union and nonunion private 
nonagricultural wage and salary workers. The unadjusted gaps are the difference in mean 
log wages between union and nonunion workers. The adjusted gaps are regression esti­
mates of the log wage differential, with the controls noted above. Both the adjusted 
and unadjusted CPS estimates net out the effects of workers with imputed earnings. 
Figure 6 











-- Unadjusted Log Wage Gap 
-a- Adjusted Log Wage Gap 
_..._ ECI Gap 
Notes: The Unadjusted and Adjusted Log Wage Gaps are from Hirsch and Schumacher (2000). based on cal­
culations from the May 1973-81 CPS and the 1983-99 CPS-ORO Earnings Files. As described in the paper. 
all CPS estimates net out a substantial downward bias in union wage gaps resulting from inclusion of workers 
with imputed earnings. The 1982 figures are the midpoints of 1981 and 1983. Control variables for the adjust­
ed gap are provided in the text. The ECI Gap is based on the Employment Cost Index for union and nonunion 
private sector wages. The ECI Gap is set equal to the CPS unadjusted gap in 1983 (.386). Years prior to and 
after 1983 represent the log deviations of the union index from its 1983 value. minus the log deviations of the 
nonunion index from its 1983 value. ECI figures are from Table 7 of the Employment Cost Index, Historical 
Listing, Bureau of Labor Statistics, July 27, 2000, available at: http://www.bls.gov/ecthome.htm 
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Focusing attention first on the unadjusted or raw log wage differential, it rises 
from about .33 log points in the early 1 970s to about .37 in the late 1 970s and early 
1 980s. The rise in the differential through 1 978 has been noted in much of the previ­
ous literature and cited as a source of increased management resistance to union organ­
izing in the 1 980s. In the previous literature, the premium is found to drop sharply in 
1 979 and throughout the early 1 980s. As Hirsch and Schumacher (2000) show, much 
of the apparent decline is due to the fact that the CPS did not report allocated earnings 
in the 1 973-1978 May CPS public use files, but did do so beginning in 1 979. Time-con­
sistent treatment of allocated earners indicates that the union gap remained high 
throughout the mid- 1980s. Since the mid- 1980s, however, there has been a decline. 
From a level of .386 log points in 1 983 (the first year of the monthly CPS earnings 
files), the differential has decreased a considerable . 1 1 log points - to .27 6 in 1 999.25 
Turning our attention to the adjusted union-nonunion wage differential, one sees 
a similar qualitative pattern. The private sector union premium reached a high in the 
1 983- 1 985 period. From a level of .236 log points in 1 983 and a high of .245 in 1 984, 
the premium declined to about .2 1 in the early 1 990s, rose a bit in the mid-1 990s, and 
then declined to .200 by 1 999, an overall decline of about .04 log points. Although 
decline in the premium is clearly evident, it is small and far less marked than the sizable 
. l l log point decline evident in the unadjusted wage series between 1983 and 1 999.26 
The difference between the adjusted and unadjusted wage gap estimates implies 
that over time the average private sector union worker's bundle of measurable charac­
teristics (e.g., schooling, demographic characteristics, broad occupation, etc.) has fallen 
in value relative to the average nonunion worker's bundle. Hence there has been far 
less change in regression estimates of the union wage differential than is evident in 
union and nonunion wage rates unadjusted for measurable characteristics. Changes in 
gender are likely to be particularly important. The proportion of union members who 
are women has increased steadily over time. The increased frequency of female union 
members pulls down the unadjusted wage gap, whereas it has little effect on the 
adjusted gap since sex is included as a control variable (in effect, female union mem­
bers are compared to female nonunion workers, and vice-versa). 
Because of the difference in conclusions reached about the time pattern of the 
union wage premium based on the CPS, it is useful to look for evidence from data 
sources other than the CPS. Unfortunately, such a comparison is not conclusive since 
overall wage trends in the CPS have differed from wage growth in the National Prod­
uct Accounts (NIPA) and the BLS Employment Cost Index (ECI). Moreover, the exact 
sources of the differences in the alternative wage series are not well understood 
(Bosworth and Perry, 1 994; Abraham et al., 1999; Krueger, 1 999). 
The ECI is a quarterly compensation survey administered by BLS, whose units of 
observation are jobs (occupations) within establishments, which in turn are cross clas­
sified by union status (among other things). We examine the ECI wage series for all pri­
vate sector union and nonunion jobs. The ECI indices have fixed weights across jobs, 
so changes should not reflect variation over time in the occupation or industry compo-
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sition. The ECI, however, does not account for changes in worker characteristics 
(schooling, age, gender, etc.). The trend in the ECI union-nonunion log wage gap is 
shown in Figure 6, with the ECI gap set equal to the unadjusted CPS gap for 1 983. The 
ECI indicates substantially slower growth in union than in nonunion wages. Over the 
1 983-1999 period, the slower growth in union wages implies a narrowing of the log 
wage differential by approximately . 1 27 log points, or an average eight-tenths of one 
percent a year.27 This is reasonably close to the . 11 log point drop in the unadjusted CPS 
differential, but greatly exceeds the modest .04 log point decline in the adjusted wage 
premium. What appears obvious from this comparison is that the ECI indices, while 
holding constant the job structure, do not account for relative changes in worker char­
acteristics. These characteristics do affect CPS regression-based wage gap estimates. 
To gain further insight into what is driving the differences in CPS and ECI wage 
changes, we examine (results not shown) whether changes in the aggregate CPS figures 
result primarily from changes in industry employment, or from wage changes that are 
roughly equivalent across broad industries. Such analysis is interesting in its own right, 
since unionized labor markets need not be homogeneous. Our conclusion is clear. In the 
CPS, disaggregation into seven broad private nonagriculatural sectors indicates that lit­
tle of the decline is accounted for by employment shifts. Holding constant employment 
shares at 1 973 levels but allowing wages to change, we obtained a pattern highly sim­
ilar to that seen when both employment shares and wages are allowed to change. Sim­
ilarly, there was little change in the wage premium when we held industry wage 
premiums constant, but allowed employment weights to change. 28 
Ultimately, we are unable to fully resolve differences between the ECI and CPS in 
either the timing or the extent of change in the union-nonunion wage differential. It is 
safe, however, to conclude that wage growth since the early 1 980s in the unionized sec­
tor has been less than in the nonunion sector and, accordingly, the union wage premium 
has fallen. Whether the decline in the premium is rather modest, as indicated by CPS 
regression estimates, or more substantial, as indicated in ECI and unadjusted CPS fig­
ures, remains unresolved. We lean toward the conclusion that the decline has been mod­
est, based on CPS wage gap estimates accounting for worker characteristics. 
Uncertainty about the magnitude of the union wage gap decline introduces a 
degree of ambiguity into our interpretation of what has been happening in U.S.  labor 
markets. As argued previously, the simultaneous decline in union membership and rel­
ative wages can be explained by inward demand shifts of the union labor demand curve 
(Figure 5). If the decline in the union wage gap is substantial, as suggested by the ECI 
or unadjusted gap, it is consistent with unions attaching a relatively large weight on 
employment, permitting the gap to narrow in order to avoid even further losses in mem­
bership. We believe it is more likely that narrowing of the union gap since the mid-
1 980s is modest, as seen in the CPS regression-based estimates. A roughly 4 percentage 
point narrowing of the wage gap from a historically high level suggests that unions 
(and their members with median preferences) have placed a high weight on maintain­
ing their relative wage advantage, despite the concomitant loss in membership. 
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Union emphasis on maintaining real wages also helps explain why the union pre­
mium rose during the late 1 970s and early 1 980s, despite declining private sector den­
sity. The suggestion is that a majority of the rank and file did not fully recognize how 
strong were the competitive pressures facing unionized companies, or did recognize 
these pressures and were willing to sustain substantial membership losses in order to 
maintain wages.29 Because economy-wide wage growth was slow during this period, 
particularly for male production workers, it is hardly surprising that there was not 
stronger political support within unions for extensive wage concessions. Ultimately, 
maintaining high wage premiums translated into larger membership losses than would 
have occurred had wage concessions been more substantial. 
An increasingly competitive economy during the 1 980s and 1 990s and greater 
nonunion competition facing unionized companies not only shifted labor demand, but 
also increased the elasticity of demand for union labor. The worsening trade-off between 
wages and employment eventually resulted in moderate restraint among labor unions 
and the narrowing union wage gap evident since the mid- 1 980s. 
VI. No Unions, New Unions, or Beyond Unions? 
In the future we will see a continuing decline in private sector union density, to a level 
below the 1 999 rate of 9.4 percent (9.5 percent among private nonagricultural workers). 
Despite modest narrowing in union wage premiums since the mid- l 980s, they remain 
sizable so that union companies are less profitable than they would be absent a union 
tax. In what is a highly competitive market environment, most nonunion establishments 
will continue to actively oppose attempts at union organizing. 
Continuation of current trends means that workers' desire for voice in the work­
place, cooperation with management, and participation in decision making will remain 
unrealized for much of the largely nonunion work force. There is likely to be a contin­
ued reliance on government regulation and mandates in the workplace, a system that is 
insufficiently flexible and overly litigious. Proposed labor law reforms could provide a 
modest boost to union organizing and slow the current decline, but moderate increases 
in new organizing will not boost union density above current levels. Labor law reforms 
could improve fairness and mitigate the contentiousness of the union organizing 
process. 30 The case for labor law reforms that substantially facilitate union organizing, 
however, is weakened by what we believe to be on balance a deleterious impact of 
unions, in their current form, on long-run economic performance. We would encour­
age reforms within the union sector that might discourage rent seeking while enhanc­
ing voice.3 1 But such reforms will have at most a modest effect on the steady-state level 
of union density. In short, it is difficult to envision changes in labor (i.e., union) law that 
will substantially improve workplace governance for the more than 90 percent of pri­
vate sector workers not directly affected. 
The description above is our best prediction for what the future holds. It is largely 
a description of the status quo, with the addition of modest reforms in labor law and a 
growing role for government in workplace regulation. This is not an altogether gloomy 
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scenario. As long as workplace regulations do not become unduly onerous, such a future 
would permit continued economic growth and an improvement in workers' standard of 
living. The economic pie would get larger and competition among employers in the 
labor market would ensure that most workers receive shares of the pie roughly com­
mensurate with their economic contribution. But such a labor market will produce a less 
than optimal level of worker voice and participation (Levine and Tyson, 1 990; Freeman 
and Lazear, 1 995; Kaufman and Levine, 2000). In principle, we should be able to do 
better. For this reason, we focus attention on proposals that might enhance voice among 
nonunion workers. Whether beneficial changes can be identified and subsequently 
adopted via our political process, however, is questionable. 
Value-Enhancing Reform in Workplace Governance. In the remainder of the paper, 
we briefly discuss the shape that value- or welfare-enhancing reforms might take. A 
prerequisite for such a discussion is to identify the criteria that desirable labor and 
employment law reforms should satisfy. We offer the following. Reforms: ( I )  should 
be value enhancing for the parties and the economy;32 (2) should involve a greater role 
for voice within nonunion as well as union workplaces; (3) should encourage cooper­
ation between management, supervisors, and line workers; (4) should allow for varia­
tion across heterogeneous workplaces; (5) should be flexible within workplaces over 
time; and (6) should limit the rent seeking goals of unions (or other worker associations) 
while enhancing provision of voice. 
Absent major reforms, it is difficult to see how the current system can evolve 
toward an employment governance structure embodying these six characteristics. Keep­
ing in mind the criteria listed above, we discuss below two general approaches that 
have the potential to be value enhancing. The first approach is termed conditional dereg­
ulation, while the second involves a change in the labor law default from no union to 
some alternative state. In each of these cases, a move away from a default governance 
structure within the firm or the default regulatory structure requires approval of both 
management and workers. The requirement for mutual agreement encourages devel­
opment of value-enhancing alternatives, as compared to the default structure. It is not 
our purpose to provide detailed proposals for these or other changes in employment 
law and industrial relations. Rather, we briefly outline general approaches that we 
believe might lead in the right direction. 
Conditional Deregulation. We find particularly attractive changes along the lines 
suggested by Levine ( 1995), who proposes a system of conditional deregulation. Levine 
recognizes that there exists a large number of governmental mandates and regulatory 
measures regarding workplace safety, hours and overtime requirements, pensions, dis­
crimination, family leave, and the like. Under a system of conditional deregulation, the 
default for all (or nearly all) firms would be that they are covered by the full extent of 
these labor market regulations. These requirements would be divided into those that 
are waivable and those non-waivable. Non-waivable rights would include some mini­
mum set of standards (say, with respect to discrimination or safety) that could not be 
waived by any employer. Conditional deregulation would permit employers to be 
exempt from the waivable set of regulatory standards and be subject only to the mini-
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mum standards if they voluntarily adopt alternative regulatory systems with employee 
oversight and approval. 
In order to waive the regulations or "deregulate" workplace standards, firms must 
have in place independent worker committees to perform the approval and oversight 
functions. For firms that are unionized, the union would provide the employee voice that 
has authority to waive government standards beyond the minimum (the employer must 
also approve the waiver). For the majority of employers who are not unionized, worker 
committees or councils would have to be created that would have authority to approve 
the waiver on behalf of workers. A contentious issue would be the nature of the worker 
committees and the permissible employer role. Unlike Levine, we would argue for abol­
ishment or major reform of 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, which restricts the creation of and role 
for worker associations or groups other than traditional labor unions. We would permit 
a reasonably active role for the firm in setting up such worker councils, as long as they 
met minimum government requirements regarding independence, democratic choice 
of worker spokespersons, secret balloting on key issues, and antidiscrimination provi­
sions protecting workers active in the worker associations.33 
An important benefit of such an approach would be that it would spur the estab­
lishment of worker associations throughout the private sector and provide a vehicle that 
might enhance worker voice and cooperation between management and its work force. 
In establishments where worker associations are formed, it is likely that their major 
role will be to enhance worker voice. Such worker groups, however, can also serve as 
a vehicle to transfer rents or quasi-rents from shareholders to workers, since their 
approval of waiving workplace regulations is likely to be conditional on the receipt of 
monetary or non-monetary gains. However, because the employer has the option of 
staying with the national regulatory standard, this makes it likely that any gains to work­
ers through rent transfer will be less than the additional gains to shareholders from 
deregulation. In short, such a policy encourages value-enhancing choices by the firm 
and workers, while constraining the extent of rent seeking. 
Adoption of a conditional deregulation scheme, as outlined above, would be likely 
to accelerate passage by Congress of waivable labor market mandates and employment 
regulations. Moreover, such regulations would likely set more stringent standards and 
contain fewer exemptions (based on company size and the like) than has been the case 
in the past. More stringent regulations could be quite costly if there were no option to 
waive coverage. Given the availability of an opt-out, however, those establishments 
where regulations would prove costly are the ones most likely to agree on a mutually­
preferred set of alternative standards. The hope is that over time more establishments 
would create workers' associations that evolve along lines that provide an effective 
vehicle for worker voice, encourage cooperation between management and its employ­
ees, and facilitate value-enhancing changes in the workplace. The widespread creation 
of worker associations may also provide the impetus for both fundamental changes in 
and growth of labor unions in the private sector. 
Changing the Labor Law Default. The second approach we consider would shift 
the labor law default from its current setting of not unionized to some alternative invok-
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ing a governance structure providing independent worker voice. The default structure 
could be waived or replaced following the joint approval of workers and management. 
A point to emphasize is that choices of a labor law default and an employment regula­
tion standard matter a lot, even where there exist procedures to modify those outcomes 
(Sunstein, 2000). For example, current labor law has a nonunion default, but allows 
majority worker choice of union representation. Imagine the opposite, with union rep­
resentation the default, but workers free to reject representation by majority vote. In a 
frictionless system in which preferences are unaffected by the initial allocation, one 
might expect the two systems to produce the same outcomes. 34 
Of course the NLRA union certification process is far from frictionless. Even 
absent such frictions, however, evidence from behavioral economics (Sunstein, 2000) 
indicates that workers would be more likely to stick with their initial endowment (col­
lective bargaining) than would have chosen to adopt it through free elections. Stated 
alternatively, were union coverage the workplace default, far more than 1 0  percent of 
private sector workers would remain unionized, even with frictionless decertification 
elections. 
What might be the outline of an alternative labor law default? It is not clear a pri­
ori what would be the optimal default for a governance structure. But the choice is 
important, since many workplaces will retain the default standard. Our own preference 
would be a default that sets into motion the creation of some form of independent 
worker association, although not one with full collective bargaining rights. As part of 
any default set of rights, workers would retain their current right to form independent 
labor unions (without management approval) . It would be important that 8(a)(2) of the 
NLRA be abolished or crippled. This would permit workers and firms to choose from 
among a range of choices beyond either a traditional labor union or a nonunion work­
place with no formal voice mechanism. We would also like the default mechanism to 
designate some standardized procedure by which workers and management might dis­
cuss, negotiate, and approve mutually beneficial changes. 
Whatever the choice of a default, it will not function well in some (or many) work­
places. The same is true for our current labor law default. In these workplaces, the 
employer and workers (either in the form of unions or worker associations) have incen­
tive to move away from the default and develop proposals for participatory workplace 
governance structures that are value enhancing. Our proposal for a change in the 
employment relations default can be combined with Levine's proposal for conditional 
deregulation. One might have a default that establishes a relatively independent worker 
association in the workplace. Management and workers could then make a joint deci­
sion to opt-out of waivable federal workplace standards. 
A benefit of changing the default is that it would encourage management, work­
ers, and workers' agents (be they traditional unions or worker associations) to com­
municate, negotiate, and arrive at alternatives that make all parties better off relative to 
the default. It is clear that the current labor law default provides little incentive for man­
agement or traditional unions to develop value-enhancing alternatives. An alternative 
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default that permitted greater flexibility, be it through conditional deregulation or 
nonunion worker associations, would encourage value-enhancing innovations. 
Obviously, any major change in employment law and the default governance struc­
ture requires thorough analysis and careful design. 35 The actual working of such a sys­
tem will be determined in no small part by the way it evolves within the workplace, 
courts, and regulatory agencies. For example, a shift in the default away from the 
nonunion standard toward one emphasizing collective voice could readily shift too 
much power to incumbent workers (insiders), leading to compensation levels incon­
sistent with full employment. Our preference would be for a default that limits the abil­
ity of worker associations or works councils to appropriate rents, but on the other hand 
encourages communication and the evolution of value-enhancing arrangements (for a 
discussion of such issues, see Freeman and Lazear, 1 995). 
We reiterate that the most likely prospect for the future, or at least the near future, 
is not some variant of the proposals discussed above, but continuation of the status quo. 
It is simply not politically possible to get from where we are currently to a major change 
in employment law. Such major changes cannot occur politically until there is strong 
dissatisfaction with our current system and a consensus that change is likely to be ben­
eficial. While such a consensus may exist among legal and industrial relations schol­
ars, it does not exist among the public at large. We do not know what economic and 
social changes might precipitate the emergence of a consensus for major changes in the 
workplace. 
VII. Conclusion 
The outlook for private sector unions, at least in their current form, is bleak. The attrition 
rate of union jobs (and workers) exceeds the rate at which workers are being organized. 
Private sector union density, currently below 10 percent, will continue its decline until it 
reaches a sustainable level. A marked improvement in the outlook for private unionism 
will require a major shift in worker and public attitudes toward workplace collective 
action, a substantial change in what unions do, or major innovations in policy regard­
ing workplace governance structures. None of these is likely in the immediate future. 
An important determinant of management resistance to unions and employment 
change in unionized firms is how unions affect firm profitability and workplace per­
formance. All evidence points to lower profits under unionism, with union effects on 
productivity being insufficient to offset what are substantial wage premiums. Surpris­
ingly, there is no consensus as to how union wage premiums have changed as private 
sector union density has declined. For a given level of labor demand, there will an 
inverse relationship between the union wage premium and membership. 36 If the demand 
for union labor is shifting downward, however, there should be a positive relationship, 
with the wage premium falling during a period of declining union density. 
A contribution of this paper is the presentation of time-consistent estimates of the 
private sector union wage premium for the years 1 973-1 999, based on work in Hirsch 
and Schumacher (2000) .  Several important results emerge from this research. First pri-
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vate sector union wage premiums are larger than public sector premiums, but over time 
public sector premiums and the share of union members in the public sector have 
increased. Hence, stability in the economy-wide union premium since the early 1 980s 
masks what has been a decline in the private sector premium. Second, Census hot-deck 
procedures used to impute the earnings of non-respondents in the CPS cause a sub­
stantial downward bias in measures of the union-nonunion wage gap. Unbiased union 
premiums are several percentage points higher than those commonly estimated and 
presented in the research literature. Changes over time in the identification of imputed 
earners in the CPS research files and changes in the proportion of workers with earn­
ings imputed have led to misleading estimates of changes in the union premium. Con­
trary to much previous evidence, union wage premiums were as high or higher in the 
1 980s as they had been in the late 1 970s. Changes in the CPS beginning in 1 994 
increased the number of workers with earnings imputed. Thus, downward bias in union 
premium estimates since 1 994 has been particularly severe. 
A third finding is that there exists large differences in the trend in union premiums 
depending on whether one focuses on unadjusted (raw) wage figures or adjusted 
(regression based) wage gaps, and whether or not one uses the CPS or ECI. Focusing 
on the change in the union premium between 1 983 and 1 999, we find a substantial nar­
rowing of the union-nonunion gap based on both unadjusted CPS earnings and pub­
lished ECI figures (the ECI controls for changes in the industry and occupation mix but 
not other worker characteristics). Time-consistent CPS regression analysis controlling 
for worker characteristics, however, indicates that narrowing of the private sector union 
premium has been rather modest. We conclude that our regression analysis provides 
the preferred measure of the wage gap. 
The modest decline in the union premium during a period in which union density 
fell sharply implies that union rank and file have placed a heavy emphasis on main­
taining wages, even though this accelerates the loss in membership. An emphasis on rent 
seeking in an increasingly competitive world guarantees that labor unions, at least in 
their traditional form, will continue their decline in the private sector. For the more than 
90 percent of private sector workers who are not union members, worker voice and 
participation in the workplace are sub-optimal. At the same time, there has been an 
increased reliance on governmental regulations and mandates coupled with a litigious 
enforcement process. 
We argue that it is time to explore alternative workplace governance structures 
that are likely to be value-enhancing, that increase worker voice and participation, that 
constrain rent-seeking behavior, and that can vary across heterogeneous workplaces 
and over time. We outline two possibilities - conditional deregulation and changing 
the governance default in the workplace. Conditional deregulation (Levine, 1 995) 
would permit an employer, with the approval of an independent worker association, to 
waive some subset of federal workplace regulations. The second proposal would change 
the governance default from one of no union to a default with some form of independ­
ent workers' association. Such an association would be set up to provide voice but to 
have limited rent-seeking power (workers would retain current rights to elect traditional 
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union representation). Alternative workplace governance rules could then be selected 
with the mutual agreement of the worker association and employer. 
Perhaps in the not so distant future, there will emerge a consensus among union 
leaders and policy makers that unionism as we know it will not rebound and that an 
expanded role for worker voice in the private sector can occur only if there is adoption 
and experimentation with new forms of worker representation. At that point, it may be 
possible for politicians, business representatives, and organized labor to design and 
rally public support for alternative forms of workplace governance. A movement in this 
direction may lead not only to improvements in social welfare, but also to a revitaliza­
tion of the labor union movement, albeit in a substantially altered form. Absent such a 
consensus, we are likely to see a continued marginalization of unions in the private 
sector, increasing governmental regulation of labor markets, and an underprovision of 
value-enhancing voice in the workplace. 
NOTES 
*We particularly appreciate detailed suggestions received from Bruce Kaufman, as well as comments from 
Jeffrey Hirsch and participants at the Roundtable on Labor Law, University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law 
and Economics. Henry Farber kindly provided data for Figures 3 and 4. 
1For example, see Freeman (1 997), Farber and Western (2000), and Lipset and Katchanovski (2001 ). 
2Writing such a paper reminds one of physicist Niels Bohr's comment: "Prediction is difficult, particularly 
of the future" (quoted in Levine, 1 995, p. 161). It is difficult enough to describe and understand the past 
using accepted research methods and building on past research. Predicting the future is far less reliable. Just 
as few predicted the meteoric rise in unionism in the middle third of last century, there were few during the 
1950s and 1 960s predicting that private sector unionism would return to pre-NLRA levels by the end of the 
century (Kaufman, 2001). 
3The equivalent density figures among all private sector wage and salary workers (including agricultural) 
are 24.2 percent, 1 6.5 percent, and 9.4 percent (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2000, Table l b ,  p. 1 2). The percent 
of private nonagricultural workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement are 18.8 percent in 1983 and 
1 0.3 percent in 1 999 (coverage figures are not available until 1 977). Unless noted otherwise, all figures on 
unionization were computed from the Current Population Survey (CPS) using methods identical to those by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), as seen in January issues of Employment and Earnings. For more 
detail, see the Hirsch and Macpherson Data Book, published annually by the Bureau of National Affairs. 
4See, also, figures presented in Chaison and Dhavale ( 1 990). Farber and Western (2000) carefully analyze the 
timing of the drop in certification elections. They conclude that the break in the election series began in the 
month just prior the PATCO strike and well before the Dotson-led NLRB board. Although they reject the 
PATCO strike as the proximate cause of the decline, they do not offer an explanation for the speed and mag­
nitude of the drop. The early-1980s decline in organizing coincides with the run-up in the value of the dol­
lar and a recession that hit particularly hard the goods-producing sector. 
5 A high initial win rate following passage of the NLRA was expected since many election units had over­
whelming worker support for representation. Over time, most election units were likely to have mixed pref­
erences. 
6Cited in Farber and Western (2000) is evidence from Weiler that the fraction of union wins resulting in first 
contracts fel l  from 86 percent in 1 955 to 63 percent in 1 980. The Dunlop Commission reports that a third or 
more certified units fail to reach a first contract. 
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7Farber and Western conclude that steady-state density is 2. 1 percent. They have adjusted their union figures 
to reflect reporting error, which causes union density to be overstated (understated) when true density is less 
(greater) than half. They rely on a misclassification rate reported by Card ( 1 996) of 2.7 percent for union and 
nonunion workers. Bias would be zero if density were SO percent, while upward bias in reported density 
would increase to a limit of 2. 7 percent as true density reached zero. A "true" rate of 2. 1 percent corresponds 
to a "reported" or measured density rate of about 4.5. 
8For a surveys and analysis, see Addison and Hirsch ( 1 989), Booth ( 1995), Hirsch ( 1997), and Kuhn ( 1998). 
Were union wage premiums simply a tax on above-normal profits, their real effects might be small. But the 
weight of the evidence is that unions tax the normal returns to capital and have real effects on investment and 
employment growth. A recent survey has measured the views of labor economists at top universities. In 
response to the question: "What is your best estimate of the percentage impact of unions on the productiv­
ity of unionized companies" the median response was zero and mean response 3. 1 percent (Fuchs, Krueger, 
and Poterba, 1 998, pp. 1392, 1 4 1 8). Absent a substantial productivity effect, union wage premiums lead to 
lower profitability. 
9For an overview of the literature on deregulation and earnings, see Peoples ( 1998). 
1 0Large union-nonunion differences in performance need not imply large effects economy-wide, since 
resources shift from nonunion to union sectors. 
1 1 Quoting Kuhn ( 1 998, p. 1039): "Like successful viruses, unions are smart enough not to kill their hosts." 
1 2 An exception is construction, where the 1 977 Kiewit decision allowing "double-breasting" (nonunion sub­
sidiaries of union contractors) played a major role in an unusually sharp decline in construction union den­
sity (Allen, 1 994). 
1 3For an analysis of the debate and views surrounding passage of the NLRA, see Kaufman ( 1996). 
14Implicit in this argument is that employment regulation and workplace protection offered by unions are sub­
stitutes, in the sense that greater government provision reduces demand for union organizing. This view need 
not be inconsistent with the finding that unionization and regulation are supplementary in the production of 
workplace safety enforcement (Wei!, 1 99 1) and workers' compensation claims (Hirsch et a!., 1 997). 
1 5For attempts at measuring the substitution between government policies and changes in union membership, 
see Neumann and Rissman ( 1 984) and Stepino and Fiorito ( 1 986). For a survey of the economic effects of 
workplace mandates and employment regulation, see Addison and Hirsch ( 1 997). 
1 6We say unlikely for three reasons. First, union wages positively affect density through their impact on 
nonunion worker preferences for organizing. But union wages negatively affect density through their impact 
on management opposition to organizing and through employment in existing union establishments. Second, 
there is typically a queue or excess supply of qualified workers who would like to obtain union jobs, but can­
not. This implies that were union wages lower, employment and membership would increase. Third, the U.S. 
has the lowest and most rapidly declining union density among OECD countries, while having the highest 
union wage premium (B lanchftower and Freeman, 1 992), supporting the thesis of a negative wage-density 
relationship. 
1 7This is the relationship emphasized by Linneman et a!. ( 1 990), who find the largest declines in union den­
sity in industries with the highest union premiums. 
18 A shift to D� does not necessarily lead to a lower preferred wage. For example, if the median union mem­
ber is not threatened by unemployment and acts in a selfish manner, union wage demands may not decline. 
Empirical evidence in coal and newspaper printing, however, suggests that "monopoly unions" give a con­
siderable weight to employment (Booth, 1 995, pp. I 0 1 - 108). Moreover, real-world outcomes are determined 
by bargaining rather than a monopoly union, making it even more likely that a downward demand shift results 
in a lower union wage. 
19Union density may also decrease owing to declining worker preferences for collective bargaining. This 
need not affect the wage premium, apart from the effect that industry density has on union bargaining power 
(see below). 
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2<Yrhe change from C to C shifts the contract zone down in wage space, leading to a lower contract wage if 
relative bargaining power remains unchanged. 
2 1Union threat effects should be nonlinear, with weak effects on wages at very low and high levels of den­
sity (Corneo and Lucifora, 1 997). 
22Log differentials are similar to percentage differences at absolute values smaller than about . 1 5 .  Log dif­
ferentials can be converted to (approximate) percentages by [exp(d)- 1 ] 1 00, where d is the log differential. 
We ignore problems with respect to the estimation of union premiums, such as specification, the endogene­
ity of union status, unmeasured worker and job attributes, and employer-employee selection on skills and pref­
erences (Card, 1 996; Hirsch and Schumacher, 1998). 
23Estimates of gender-specific means above the cap for 1 973- 1 999 are shown in Hirsch and Macpherson 
(2000, p. 6). These values are approximately 1 . 5  times the cap, with smaller female means and modest growth 
over time. 
24Wage gap estimates with respect to match criteria (e.g., schooling, gender, occupation) are not biased. 
25 Absent adjustment for the imputed earnings bias, we obtain unadjusted union wage gap estimates of .345 
in 1 983 and .210 in 1 999 (a . 1 35 log point decline), as compared to the differentials .386 and .276 reported 
in Figure 6. 
26The downward bias from the Census imputation procedure is largest in years since 1 994, so our correction 
for the bias leads not only to higher union wage gap estimates, but a smaller decline in the gap than would 
result absent the correction. Despite the seeming clarity of these results, they stand in contrast to the view 
that the union wage gap shows little trend (Blanchflower 1 999; Bratsberg and Ragan, 1 999). Hirsch and 
Macpherson (2000) find a small change in the economy-wide wage gap, as compared to a decline in the pri­
vate sector gap. The seeming constancy of the overall gap is the result of an increasing public sector union 
differential coupled with an increasing proportion of union members over time being in the public sector. 
27See the note to Figure 6 for details of how the ECI differentials are calculated. Katz and Krueger ( 1 999, 
BPEA, Table 1 4) cite evidence on ECI total compensation growth for union and nonunion workers. 
28Bratsberg and Ragan ( 1 999) use a more detailed industry breakdown and find lower dispersion in the CPS 
wage premium, but little change in the aggregate level. The ECI also provides broad breakdowns for goods­
producing versus service-producing sectors and manufacturing versus nonmanufacturing, each classified by 
union status. Relative union-nonunion wage growth differs little across these broad sectors, again indicating 
that employment shifts and industry heterogeneity play a minor role in accounting for changes over time in 
the union wage gap. 
29This sentiment is expressed in a recent Business Week column: "A whole generation of unionists settled for 
this strategy: protecting senior unionized workers, knowing that their numbers would diminish over time" 
(Kuttner, 2000). 
30Empirical evidence on the effects of workplace mandates is surveyed in Addison and Hirsch ( 1 997). Dis­
cussion of labor law reforms is beyond the scope of our paper. Among the recommendations proposed by the 
recent Dunlop Commission were: narrowing the definition of supervisory and managerial workers who are 
exempt from the NLRA, shortening the time between the call for union elections and conduct of the elec­
tions, increased access of workers to union organizers, procedures such as mediation to facilitate newly cer­
tified unions to achieve first contracts, and fast injunctive relief against discriminatory action by employers. 
For examples of labor law reforms that generally promote "value-added" unionism, see Estreicher ( 1 996). 
31 Such reforms might include profit sharing or plant-level bargaining, each of which might make the demands 
of the median union member more sensitive to firm performance (we thank Bruce Kaufman for these sug­
gestions). 
32 Abowd ( 1 989b) defines the value of the "enterprise" as the sum of firm market value plus worker rents. For 
a change to be value enhancing to the parties, we mean that the value of the enterprise has increased. 
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33The TEAM Act, passed by Congress but vetoed by President Clinton in July 1996, would have limited the 
scope of 8(a)(2) and allowed employer-organized and employer-funded worker participation groups in 
nonunion plants and offices. Levine would continue protections that prevent creation of "company unions." 
For evidence on how company unions worked prior to passage of the NLRA, see Kaufman (2000). 
34We ignore the issue of obtaining first contracts, regarding majority approval as leading to union coverage. 
35Relevant will be the experience that other countries have had with worker councils and alternative forms 
of organization. For a recent analysis and references, see Addison et a\. (2000). 
36 As noted previously, when settlements are on a vertical contract curve this holds only in the long run. 
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